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In re Rollins Environmental Services: The Disqualification
of an Administrative Agency Decision Maker
On August 5, 1985, the Secretary of the Louisiana Department of
Environmental Quality personally investigated a complaint against a
hazardous waste disposal facility operated by Rollins Environmental
Services, Inc. On the basis of that investigation, the Secretary issued a
compliance order.' Rollins requested a hearing on the compliance order, 2
and then moved for the recusal of the Secretary from any participation
in the hearing,3 on the basis of several of her public statements, 4 in-
cluding: "I intend to use every legal means at my disposal to close this
facility and keep it closed," 5 and "It is our opinion that Rollins should
not be given any more time to demonstrate it is a good neighbor. They
have been given enough time.''6 The Louisiana Supreme Court held that
Copyright 1987, by LOUISIANA LAW REviEw.
1. The compliance order directed Rollins to submit a plan to the Department of
Environmental Quality within thirty days from the issuance of the order. The plan was
to outline the timetables and steps Rollins would take to cease the receipt or disposal of
hazardous waste at the facility within six months from the date the plan would be
submitted. In re Rollins Environmental Services, 481 So. 2d 113 (La. 1985).
2. The hearing was requested pursuant to La. R.S. 30:1072(A) (Supp. 1987).
3. The Secretary had named a hearing officer to take evidence and make findings
of fact, but had reserved to herself the determination of any penalty assessment. Moreover,
the Secretary had the right to review any decision by the hearing officer pursuant to La.
R.S. 30:1066.1(D) (Supp. 1987). Rollins, 481 So. 2d at 114, 117.
4. The following statements were quoted in Rollins:
August 7, 1985: "I can't conscionably do anything else [i.e., close down ROLLINS]
.... They have been given enough time already. I intend to use every legal means at
my disposal to close this facility and keep it closed."
August 9, 1985: "[E]ven [sic] if the company came in tomorrow and said it would
turn the site into a state-of-the-art facility that could be run perfectly in compliance, I
wouldn't give them any more time."
August 20, 1985: "We can't continue to give ROLLINS [sic] more and more time to
experiment with new technology," and further "[W]e [sic] have given them enough time.
Now it's time for them to find other places to carry on their business."
August 26, 1985: "Our position is that the facility is going to be closed, and we're
going to use every legal means to close it."
September 6, 1985: "I'm still moving toward closure. The State [sic] intends to use
every means to close the plant .... I'm not backing down at all. If anything, I'm
strengthening the State's [sic] case."
September 26, 1985: "We do not intend for the incinerator to remain open as a
commercial incinerator. We have no intention to allow the incinerator to remain open
while the rest of the facility closes. It is our intention to treat this problem as a sitewide
problem to close the entire facility .... " Rollins, 481 So. 2d at 115-16 & n.8.
5. Id. (August 7, 1985 statement).
6. Id. (August 6, 1985 statement).
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the Secretary's statements evidenced a "disqualifying bias" which
amounted to a prejudgment of the adjudicative facts at issue and ordered
that the Secretary be recused from further participation in the adjudi-
cative proceedings against Rollins. In re Rollins Environmental Services,
481 So. 2d 113 (La. 1985).
This note evaluates the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Rollins
in two separate sections. The first analyzes the court's conclusion of
disqualifying prejudgment on the part of the Secretary. The second
criticizes a brief, conclusory determination by the court that the com-
bination of investigative and adjudicative functions in the Secretary did
not alone require recusal from her decision making role.
Disqualifying Prejudgment
The due process clauses of both the United States7 and Louisiana'
Constitutions guarantee the right to an unbiased and impartial decision
maker in adjudications. The proposition that a fair trial in a fair tribunal
is a basic requirement of due process9 has been extended by the United
States Supreme Court to adjudications by administrative agencies.10 The
Louisiana Supreme Court has likewise recognized the requirement of
due process in administrative adjudications:
The essential guarantee of the Due Process Clause is [a]
fundamentally fair procedure for the individual in the resolution
of the factual and legal basis for government actions which
deprive him of life, liberty or property .... Therefore, there
must be some type of neutral and detached decision maker, be
it judge, hearing officer or agency."
The statutory basis for recusal of the Secretary in Rollins was
Louisiana Revised Statutes (La. R.S.) 49:960(B). That section, a part
of the Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act, provides for the with-
drawal or disqualification of an agency member from any adjudication
"in which he cannot accord a fair and impartial hearing or consider-
7. See, e.g., Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242, 100 S. Ct. 1610, 1613
(1980); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471, 85 S. Ct. 546, 548 (1965); Irvin v. Dowd,
366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S. Ct. 1639, 1642 (1961); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523, 47
S. Ct. 437, 441 (1927).
8. See, e.g., Bell v. Department of Health & Human Resources, 483 So. 2d 945,
951 (La. 1986); Wilson v. City of New Orleans, 479 So. 2d 891 (La. 1985).
9. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S. Ct. 623, 625 (1955). See also United
States v. Brown, 539 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1976).
10. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 1022 (1970);
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46, 95 S. Ct. 1456, 1464 (1975).
11. Wilson, 479 So. 2d at 901.
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ation.' 2 The Rollins court found that the provisions of this statute are
grounded in due process.1 3 This finding, along with the court's author-
itative use of cases decided on due process grounds, 4 indicates that the
provisions of the statute are to be applied to comply with jurispruden-
tially established standards of due process.
The bias that the supreme court found in Rollins has been called
both "prejudgment"' 5 and "actual"' 6 bias. For the purposes of this
note, these labels simply address a situation where it is found that a
decision maker has prejudged the facts pertaining to a particular ad-
judication, as evidenced by that person's prior statements or actions.
Using Professor Davis' Administrative Law Treatise as authority,
the Rollins court made an initial distinction concerning the nature of
the prejudgment, a distinction which several other courts have also found
important. Prejudgment or a point of view about a matter of law,
policy, or legislative fact, even if publicly expressed, is not a sufficient
ground for disqualification; however, public expression of prejudgment
of adjudicative facts 7 does require disqualification. 8
In support of this general rule, some authorities advance the position
that, quite the opposite of being grounds for disqualification, a pre-
12. La. R.S. 49:960(B) (Supp. 1987) provides, in pertinent part:
A subordinate deciding officer or agency member shall withdraw from any
adjudicative proceeding in which he cannot accord a fair and impartial hearing
or consideration. Any party may request the disqualification of a subordinate
deciding officer or agency member, on the ground of his inability to give a
fair and impartial hearing ....
13. Rollins, 481 So. 2d at 119. See also Comment, Louisiana's "New" Administrative
Procedure Act: Legislative Symposium, 35 La. L. Rev. 629, 631 (1975). For further
commentary on the Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act, of which La. R.S. 49:960
is a part, see Dakin, The Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act - Critique
and Commentary, 25 La. L. Rev. 799 (1965); Force and Griffith, The Louisiana Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 42 La. L. Rev. 1227 (1982).
14. E.g., Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 75 S. Ct. 623; Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S.
564, 93 S. Ct. 1689 (1973); Amos Treat & Co. v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 306
F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
15. City of Charlottesville v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 774 F.2d 1205,
1212 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1515 (1986); Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc. v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 647 F.2d 1130, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Consumer
Protection Div. Office of Attorney Gen. v. Consumer Publishing Co., 304 Md. 731, 501
A.2d 48 (1985); In re Johnston, 99 Wash. 2d 466, 663 P.2d 457 (1983).
16. See, e.g., Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 n.8, 102 S. Ct. 1665, 1670
n.8 (1982); Kizer v. Dorchester County Vocational Educ. Bd., 287 S.C. 542, 340 S.E.2d
144, 148 (1986); Johnston, 99 Wash. 2d at 481, 663 P.2d at 465.
17. Adjudicative facts have been described as "those to which the law is applied in
the process of adjudication," while legislative facts "help the tribunal determine the
content of law and of policy." K. Davis, Administrative Law Text 296 (3d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter Davis Text].
18. Rollins, 481 So. 2d at 120.
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judgment or point of view concerning a matter of law or policy is
desirable for one serving in a judicial capacity, particularly an admin-
istrative agency official. 9 Professor Davis asks rhetorically: "Do not
the best of judges have unalterable convictions on some questions that
are at the heart of particular decisions?" ' 20 He adds, somewhat tongue-
in-cheek: "In creating new administrative law, judges cannot be and
should not purport to be objective or neutral. Like the writer of this
treatise, they should have the right biases! '21
A preconceived point of view concerning a matter of law or policy
is acceptable particularly in the case of an administrative agency official
acting as a judge. The wisdom behind allowing such preconceptions goes
to the heart of a major reason for the existence of administrative
agencies, that such agencies were created to implement the policies and
laws of the body delegating the authority to the agency. A logical
extension of this purpose is that "[a]gency decisionmakers are appointed
precisely to implement statutory programs, and so inevitably have some
policy preconceptions.'"22
An appropriate example of where such policy preconceptions or
biases are desirable is the office of the Secretary of the Louisiana
Department of Environmental Quality. The Louisiana Environmental
Quality Act begins with a declaration that the maintenance of a healthful
and safe environment is a matter of critical state concern.23 It then
creates the Department of Environmental Quality, as "the primary agency
in the state concerned with environmental protection and regulation.' '24
The Act further provides that this agency is to be headed by a secretary 25
19. Maloney, Disqualification of Administrative Law Judges in California, 16 U.S.F.
L. Rev. 229, 245 (1982) [hereinafter Maloney]; Note, Disqualification of Administrative
Officials for Bias, 13 Vand. L. Rev. 712, 721 (1960). See also Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S.
824, 93 S. Ct. 7 (1972), in which Justice Rehnquist remarked: "Proof that a Justice's
mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of constitutional
adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias." 409 U.S. at
835, 93 S. Ct. at 14.
20. 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 375 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter Davis
Treatise].
21. Id. at 382.
22. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 647 F.2d at 1179.
23. La. R.S. 30:1052(1) (Supp. 1987). That statute further provides:
(2) It is necessary and desirable for the protection of the public welfare and
property of the people of Louisiana that there be maintained at all times, both
now and in the future, clean air and water resources, preservation of the scenic
beauty and ecological regimen of certain free flowing streams, and strictly
enforced programs for the safe and sanitary disposal of solid waste, for the
management of hazardous waste, for the control of hazards due to natural and
man-made radiation, considering sound policies regarding employment and eco-
nomic development in Louisiana.
24. La. R.S. 30:1061(A)(1) (Supp. 1987).
25. La. R.S. 30:1061(B) (Supp. 1987).
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having, among other powers and duties, the duty to adopt regulations
"for the protection of the environment ' 26 and to "exercise all incidental
powers necessary or proper to carry out the purposes of this Chapter.
27
Thus, the Secretary of the Department of Environmental Quality should
have certain policy preconceptions, among them the notion that envi-
ronmental matters are of critical concern to the state.
The Rollins court never explicitly classified the Secretary's statements
as pertaining to policy, law, or adjudicative facts. Nevertheless, the
outcome demonstrates that the court did not find that the statements
pertained to law or policy. The court apparently inferred that the state-
ments evidenced prejudgment of adjudicative facts: the Secretary stated
that she intended to close the facility, which could not be done unless
violations were found; therefore, the Secretary had prejudged the ad-
judicative fact of violation.21
A comparison of the Secretary's statements in Rollins29 to statements
characterized in other cases as involving preconceptions of law or policy °
reveals a distinction regarding the nature of the references to the party
under investigation. While the statements in these other cases do not
identify any particular entity, the statements in Rollins all refer specif-
ically to the party to the adjudication, Rollins Environmental. Courts
will be much less likely to characterize such specific statements as state-
ments of agency "policy" than statements which are broad and which
identify no particular entity. However, an element of specificity in a
public statement is not an automatic indicator that the statement merits
disqualification. Noncommittal, nonadversary press releases referring to
a specific party are not evidence of disqualifying prejudgment.'
After distinguishing between prejudgment of policy and adjudicative
fact, the Rollins court used a "disinterested observer" test to determine
whether there had been, in fact, a prejudgment. This test inquires whether
a disinterested observer may conclude that the decision maker has in
some measure adjudged the facts of a particular case in advance of
hearing it.3 2 Although the disinterested observer test has been used by
26. La. R.S. 30:1061(D) (Supp. 1987).
27. La. R.S. 30:1061(D)(14) (Supp. 1987).
28. See Rollins, 481 So. 2d at 121.
29. See supra note 4.
30. See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702-03, 68 S.
Ct. 793, 804 (1948); Anstey v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 292 N.W.2d 380 (Iowa
1980).
31. See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, 404
F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Consumer Protection, 304 Md. at 763-67, 501 A.2d at 65-
66.
32. Rollins, 481 So. 2d at 121.
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some courts,33 instances of its explicit application are rare, perhaps
because courts find it unnecessary after finding that the statements in
question pertained to policy or law.3
4
The application of the disinterested observer test is best illustrated
in Texaco v. Federal Trade Commission,35 a case where disqualifying
prejudgment was found. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued
a complaint against the Texas Company (Texaco) and B.F. Goodrich,
charging that a contract between the two companies implemented unfair
methods of competition in interstate commerce. Prior to a hearing before
the Commission, Chairman Paul Rand Dixon made a speech before the
National Congress of Petroleum Retailers, in which he stated:
"We at the Commission are well aware of the practices which
plague you and we have challenged their legality in many im-
portant cases.
You know the practices - price fixing, price discrimination,
and overriding commissions on [tires, batteries, and accessories].
You know the companies - Atlantic, Texas, Pure, Shell, Sun,
Standard of Indiana, American, Goodyear, Goodrich, and Fire-
stone. "36
In reviewing the Commission's decision, which was adverse to Texaco
and Goodrich, the court considered the propriety of Chairman Dixon's
participation in that decision, and concluded that "a disinterested reader
of Chairman Dixon's speech could hardly fail to conclude that he had
in some measure decided in advance that Texaco had violated the Act." 37
A comparison of the statements made by the Secretary in Rollins"8
with the statements made by the Chairman in the Texaco case and with
statements which were found in other cases to evidence a disqualifying
bias 9 shows the propriety of the decision in Rollins. The statements in
Rollins alluded even more specifically and exclusively to the party being
33. See, e.g., Charlottesville, 774 F.2d at 1212; Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools
v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 425 F.2d 583, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Texaco v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 336 F.2d 754, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. Securities & Exch.
Comm'n, 267 F.2d 461, 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896, 80 S. Ct. 200 (1959).
34. See, e.g., Ash Grove Cement Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 577 F.2d 1368 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 982, 99 S. Ct. 571 (1978); Anstey, 292 N.W.2d at 390-91;
New Hampshire Milk Dealers' Ass'n v. New Hampshire Milk Control Bd., 107 N.H.
335, 222 A.2d 194 (1966).
35. 336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
36. Id. at 759, quoting a press release issued by the Commission which quoted the
Chairman's speech.
37. Id. at 760.
38. See supra note 4.
39. See, e.g., Staton v. Mayes, 552 F.2d 908 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 907,
98 S. Ct. 309 (1977); Cinderella, 425 F.2d at 589-90.
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charged than did the statements found to evidence disqualifying bias in
these other cases.4 0 The additional factors of repetition and apparent
sharp adversity of the Secretary's statements add support to the court's
conclusion of disqualifying prejudgment. Furthermore, the Secretary's
statements were made in conclusive language, indicative of a final de-
cision. If the Secretary had spoken in terms of alleged violations, or
indicated that the Department had reason to believe that violations had
occurred, the jurisprudence indicates that the result as to the issue of
prejudgment would have been different. 4' The statements neither hinted
at possible violations nor dealt in undirected innuendos; the implications
of conclusions that violations had occurred were direct and unmistakable.
A disinterested observer of the statements in Rollins would probably
not only conclude that the Secretary had in some measure prejudged
the facts, but that the Secretary had totally prejudged the facts.
In an exhibition of awareness of human nature, the Rollins court
noted a substantial problem with public statements which manifest pre-
judgment of adjudicative facts. After publicly making such statements,
a decision maker is not likely to reach a different conclusion at a
hearing, even if the evidence introduced at the hearing warrants a change
of position. 42 The court's concern with such an "entrenched position ' 43
is understandable. A decision maker would have to be of exceptional
character to decide contrarily to a position stated strongly in public
numerous times, considering the loss of credibility and respect such a
decision would likely entail.
After making the distinction between prejudgment of adjudicative
facts and preconceptions of law, policy, or legislative facts, and then
determining by way of the disinterested observer test that there had been
prejudgment, the court concluded that "the secretary's statements evi-
dence a disqualifying bias which requires that she be recused from any
decision making role with regard to the charges against Rollins Envi-
ronmental Services, Inc." Even though the propriety of this conclusion
is amply supported by the necessity of protecting Rollins' due process
rights, one cannot help but question the adequacy of the test utilized
by the Rollins court as a means of proving the presence of disqualifying
prejudice. Would the Secretary have prejudged the facts any less if she
had made no statements to the press? Despite the inadequacy of the
40. See Cinderella, 425 F.2d at 589-90. But see Belsinger v. District of Columbia,
295 F. Supp. 159 (D.D.C.), rev'd on other grounds, 436 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1969), where
specific references were allowed when the conduct of the party claiming prejudgment was
described as "alleged."
41. See Belsinger, 295 F. Supp at 162; Cinderella, 425 F.2d at 590.
42. Rollins, 481 So. 2d at 121.
43. Cinderella, 425 F.2d at 590.
44. Rollins, 481 So. 2d at 121.
19871
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
test, however, due process considerations demand that such statements
should not be ignored merely because some other decision makers may
be prejudging facts and simply not commenting on their position, if
for no other reason than that it is important to maintain the appearance
of complete fairness.45
Combination of Functions
In contrast to a situation where disqualification of an agency decision
maker is granted on the basis of statements or other actions evidencing
prejudgment of adjudicative facts, parties have often sought disquali-
fication on the grounds of "institutional bias, "46 "inherent bias," '47 or
"structural bias. "48 Parties and courts using these labels are all addressing
a situation in which due process arguably requires that the official, by
the very nature of the combination of functions he performs, should
not be allowed to decide an adjudication. Professor Davis abbreviates
this idea neatly, writing that "[j]udging should be separated from func-
tions that are incompatible with judging." '49
The Rollins court cited Withrow v. Larkin5° as authority for its
conclusion that the Secretary's prior investigative function in the matter
did not alone require recusal.5' An important case for its holdings on
the issue of due process limits on combined functions in an administrative
agency, Withrow exemplifies the United States Supreme Court's tolerance
of systems of combined functions.52 The Withrow court began its analysis
of this issue by conceding that a 'fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
requirement of due process,"' 53 and that this requirement applies to
adjudications of administrative agencies. 54 After identifying two situations
45. Rollins, 481 So. 2d at 119. See also, Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14,
75 S. Ct. 11, 13 (1954); Brown, 539 F.2d at 469-70; Cinderella, 425 F.2d at 591.
46. Wolkenstein v. Reville, 694 F.2d 35, 42 (2d Cir. 1982).
47. Porter County Chapter of Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1363, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1979); In re Del Rio, 400 Mich.
665, 691, 256 N.W.2d 727, 737 (1977), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 1029, 98 S. Ct. 759
(1978).
48. Porter County, 606 F.2d at 1371.
49. Davis Treatise, supra note 20, at 340.
50. 421 U.S. 35, 95 S. Ct. 1456 (1975).
51. Rollins, 481 So. 2d at 121.
52. Professor Davis states in his 1980 treatise that "[a]lthough at least eleven Supreme
Court opinions have dealt with problems about separation of functions, the Court has
never held a system of combined functions to be a violation of due process." Davis
Treatise, supra note 20, at 343.
53. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 46, 95 S. Ct. at 1464, quoting Murchison, 349 U.S. at
136, 75 S. Ct. at 625.
54. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 46, 95 S. Ct. at 1464, citing Gibson, 411 U.S. at 579, 93
S. Ct. at 1698.
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"in which experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the
part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally
tolerable," 5 the Court laid down a rule reflecting its attitude toward
combinations of functions: "The contention that the combination of
investigative and adjudicative functions necessarily creates an unconsti-
tutional risk of bias in administrative adjudication has a much more
difficult burden of persuasion to carry. It must overcome a presumption
of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators .. ".."I, The
Court further noted that "[w]ithout a showing to the contrary, state
administrators 'are assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual
discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis
of its own circumstances."' 57
Citing Withrow, the Rollins court characterized the Secretary's prior
investigatory involvement in the matter as "mere exposure to the evi-
dence.""8 A comparison of the relevant facts of the two cases suggests,
however, that the use of Withrow as authority for this proposition was
not appropriate. The Secretary's prior involvement in the matter far
exceeded "mere exposure to the evidence."
In Withrow, an examining board composed of practicing physicians
held an investigative hearing to determine whether a physician, Dr.
Larkin, had engaged in certain proscribed acts. At this investigative
hearing, the board heard several witnesses on the issues. The board
subsequently sent Dr. Larkin a notice of a contested hearing at which
the board would determine whether his license should be suspended. Dr.
Larkin protested, arguing that this would deprive him of his due process
rights to a neutral and detached decision maker. Characterizing the
board's involvement in the matter as "mere exposure to evidence,'' 5 9
the Supreme Court held that the board could constitutionally make the
decision concerning the license suspension at the contested hearing not-
withstanding the combination of its functions.65
Although the Rollins court made no comprehensive findings of the
degree of the Secretary's involvement in the matter, the following facts
can be gleaned from the opinion. Upon receiving a complaint, the
Secretary personally investigated the facility site. 61 Based on the con-
55. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47, 95 S. Ct. at 1464. The Court cited situations in which
the adjudicator has a pecuniary interest in the outcome and cases in which he has been
the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him.
56. Id. at 47, 95 S. Ct. at 1464.
57. Id. at 55, 95 S. Ct. at 1468, quoting United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409,
421, 61 S. Ct. 999, 1004 (1941).
58. Rollins, 481 So. 2d at 121.
59. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 55, 95 S. Ct. at 1468.
60. Id. at 57, 95 S. Ct. at 1469.
61. Rollins, 481 So. 2d at 115.
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ditions allegedly found at the facility (black smoke emissions, malfunc-
tioning equipment, and general confusion), the Secretary ordered an
immediate shut down of the incinerator and issued a Compliance Order. 62
The Secretary was then to determine any penalty assessment at a hearing
on the Compliance Order. Also, she was to have the right to review
any decision reached at the hearing, 63 at which time she would have
had the right to either remand the matter, render a contrary decision
on the record of the hearing, or hold a new hearing and render her
own decision or order. 64 Presumably basing its decision on this com-
bination of functions in the Secretary in this matter, the court concluded
that "[the Secretary's] investigative function with regard to Rollins (mere
exposure to the evidence) would not alone require recusal. ' 6s
In determining whether disqualification is appropriate, the nature
and extent of the prior involvement of the decision maker in the matter
should be examined. Persons with significant personal adversary in-
volvement in a particular case are more likely to be disqualified from
an adjudicative position in that case. 66 The decision making body in
Withrow sat in a somewhat impartial role at an investigative hearing at
which specific facts gathered by others were presented. 67 This "inves-
tigative" function exercised by the board in that case was very similar
to that exercised by a judge at a probable cause hearing, 68 and may
reasonably be labelled "mere exposure to evidence." On the other hand,
the Secretary in Rollins personally investigated the site and gathered
facts in a much more adversarial role. If the Secretary had been allowed
to exercise an adjudicative function along with such an investigative
function in the same matter, the situation would have been more anal-
ogous to allowing a police officer to judge at trial the same facts which
he had gathered in his role as investigator. Thus, the Rollins court's
characterization of the Secretary's investigative function as "mere ex-
posure to the evidence," along with its citation to Withrow for that
proposition, is highly questionable. It fails to consider the context in
which the "mere exposure" statement of Withrow was made.
Citing Withrow, some courts have upheld combinations of investi-
gative and adjudicative functions, 69 while others have extended Withrow
62. Id.
63. Id. at 114. See also supra note 3.
64. See La. R.S. 30:1066.1(D) (Supp. 1987).
65. Rollins, 481 So. 2d at 121.
66. See Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: Separation of Functions in the Federal
Administrative Agencies, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 759, 760 (1981) [hereinafter Asimow].
67. See Maloney, supra note 19, at 257 n.131 (partly explaining the result of Withrow
on this basis).
68. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 56, 95 S. Ct. at 1469.
69. See, e.g., Ash Grove, 577 F.2d at 1376-77; In Re Del Rio, 400 Mich. at 689-
92, 256 N.W.2d at 736-37.
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to apply to almost any combination of functions. 70 However, along with
the nature and extent of the decision maker's prior involvement in the
matter, significant distinctions exist between the facts of Withrow and
the facts of Rollins which the Rollins court failed to consider.
Rollins differs from Withrow and most other cases allowing com-
binations of functions in that Rollins involved a combination of functions
in a single individual. The combination of functions upheld in Withrow
was in a board. Combinations of functions have also been upheld in
the Federal Trade Commission, 7' the Washington State Medical Disci-
plinary Board, 72 and the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights,73
among others.
A footnote in the Withrow opinion distinguished three earlier cases
in which decision makers were disqualified. These cases all had one
factual feature in common: unlike Withrow, which allowed a combi-
nation of functions in an examining board, they all involved a com-
bination of functions in one individual.74 The United States Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in American Cyanamid Co. v. Federal Trade Com-
mission,7 disqualified the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission
from an adjudicatory proceeding because he had previously served ac-
tively on a Senate Subcommittee which had conducted an investigation
into many of the same legal and factual issues that were before the
Commission. In Trans World Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Board,76 a
C.A.B. member's participation in an adjudication was found improper
because he had signed a brief in behalf of a party to the proceedings
prior to becoming a member of the Board. Finally, in Amos Treat &
Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission,7 7 it was found violative of
due process for a member of the Commission to participate in an
adjudication when he had supervised the initiation and conduct of the
investigation prior to becoming a Commissioner. The Amos Treat court
stated:
We are unable to accept the view that a member of an inves-
tigative or prosecuting staff may initiate an investigation, weigh
70. See, e.g., Jonal Corp. v. District of Columbia, 533 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 825, 97 S. Ct. 80 (1976) (combination of adjudicative, prosecutorial,
and investigative); Consumer Protection, 304 Md. at 761-63, 501 A.2d at 64-65 (adjudicative
and prosecutorial); Johnston, 99 Wash. 2d at 476-78, 663 P.2d at 463-64 (adjudicative,
prosecutorial, and investigative); La Petite Auberge, Inc. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for
Human Rights, 419 A.2d 274 (R.I. 1980) (adjudicative, investigative, and inquisitorial).
71. Ash Grove, 577 F.2d at 1376-77.
72. Johnston, 99 Wash. 2d at 477, 663 P.2d at 463.
73. La Petite Auberge, 419 A.2d at 284-85.
74. 421 U.S. at 50 n.16, 95 S. Ct at 1466 n.16.
75. 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966).
76. 254 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
77. 306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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its results, perhaps then recommend the filing of charges, and
thereafter become a member of that commission or agency,
participate in adjudicatory proceedings, join in commission or
agency rulings and ultimately pass upon the possible amenability
of the respondents to the administrative orders of the commission
or agency. So to hold, in our view, would be tantamount to
that denial of administrative due process against which both the
Congress and the courts have inveighed. 78
Professor Davis has questioned the validity of the Amos Treat case. 79
However, he has also recognized that "the principle which opposes the
combination of functions has to do with individuals, not with large and
complex organizations." 80 While criticizing what he characterized as an
"unsound ... broadside condemnation" of combinations of functions
within an organization (the FTC),8 Davis distinguished between such a
combination and a combination of functions in an individual:
For an individual to serve as both advocate and judge in the
same case is obviously improper, because "A man who has
buried himself in one side of an issue is disabled from bringing
to his [sic] decision that dispassionate judgment which Anglo-
American tradition demands of officials who decide questions. '82
Cases decided since Withrow have also found a combination of
functions in one individual to violate due process."3 Although upholding
the constitutionality of a combination of functions in an institution,
other cases have, either in dicta or as a point of distinction, observed
generally that a combination in an individual is improper.8 4
78. Id. at 266-67.
79. Davis Treatise, supra note 20, at 346. The Amos Treat and Trans World cases
have also been criticized by Professor Asimow on the grounds of lack of depth of analysis.
However, Professor Asimow recognized that these cases nevertheless "suggest that the
government's interest in resisting disqualification of single members of multimember agen-
cies, on the basis of adversary activity occurring before they became agency heads, may
be less than compelling." Asimow, supra note 66, at 787.
80. Davis Text, supra note 17, at 254.
81. Id. at 254-55.
82. Id., quoting S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., at 56 (1941).
83. See, e.g., Commonwealth Dep't of Ins. v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 478 Pa.
532, 387 A.2d 449 (1978); Dussia v. Barger, 466 Pa. 152, 351 A.2d 667 (1975); Huber
Pontiac, Inc. v. Allphin, 431 F. Supp. 1168 (S.D. I11. 1977), vacated on other grounds,
585 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1978). See also deKoevend v. Board of Educ., 688 P.2d 219 (Colo.
1984), holding that the mere presence of two individuals, who had personally been involved
in the earlier process of the case, during the deliberative process violated the plaintiff's
due process right to a fair and impartial determination by the board.
84. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 467 F.2d 67, 79
(10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909, 94 S. Ct. 1617 (1974) (distinguishing Amos
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However, the reported decisions are not in unanimous agreement
on the issue of a combination of functions in an individual. Some cases
have allowed such a combination. Morris v. City of Danville, 5 involved
a city manager's performance of a variety of functions. The city manager
initiated investigation of the city's chief of police, concluded preliminarily
to terminate the chief's employment on the basis of the investigation,
and then allowed the chief an opportunity to refute the basis of the
termination at a hearing at which the city manager was to be the decision
maker. The United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded
that procedural due process was not denied "solely by virtue of the
prior participation of the ultimate decisionmaker . . . in the adminis-
trative process leading to [the chief's] final discharge.'"'8
In spite of those few cases upholding a combination of functions
in an individual, strong policy reasons support invalidating such a com-
bination when the individual has had significant prior involvement in
the matter in a personal, adversarial nature. Foremost among these
reasons is the desire for a decision maker who is "neutral and de-
tached.""7 Even though this goal is to some extent in conflict with the
desire that an administrative agency official have certain biases and
preconceptions concerning policy and law, 8 a compromise between the
two should be sought. An idea which seems to achieve a just compromise
is that "an individual who tries to win for one side should not participate
in judging .... The law of the subject would be much improved if...
a statute provided simply that any individual with a will to win for one
side may not participate in judging.''89
When one agency official charged with the duty of enforcing a law
personally investigates a scene for the purpose of discovering statutory
violations, one can easily see how that person may carry into an ad-
judication a psychological predisposition toward victory, a "will to win."
If, on the other hand, such an investigator is not allowed to participate
in decision making, and instead another person is charged as decision
maker, there is sufficient insulation from the discovery of the facts so
that the new decision maker should not have the same "will to win,"
but rather can maintain the desired qualities of "neutrality and detach-
Treat); Gashgai v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 390 A.2d 1080, 1082 n.1 (Me.
1978); La Petite Auberge, 419 A.2d at 284; Consumer Protection, 304 Md. at 761-63,
501 A.2d at 64-65; State Dental Council & Examining Bd. v. Pollock, 457 Pa. 264, 318
A.2d 910 (1974).
85. 744 F.2d 1041 (4th Cir. 1984).
86. Id. at 1049. See also Estrin v. Moss, 221 Tenn. 657, 430 S.W.2d 345 (1968),
appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 318, 89 S. Ct. 554 (1969).
87. Wilson, 479 So. 2d at 901.
88. See text accompanying supra notes 19-27.
89. Davis Treatise, supra note 20, at 340.
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ment." Such a combination of functions within an agency, but not in
a single person, allows a sufficient degree of fairness to comport with
due process. At the same time, an agency may perform in a manner
consistent with one reason that agencies were created: to have a body
making decisions with knowledge and expertise of the relevant subject
matter.
The appearance of fairness also supports invalidation of a combi-
nation of adjudicative and other functions in one individual who was
personally involved in the matter at prior stages. Citing Amos Treat &
Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission,90 the Rollins court, in its
"prejudgment" analysis, stated that "there must also be in connection
with the hearing the appearance of ... fairness." 9' Yet the court did
not consider the appearance of fairness in its conclusion that the Sec-
retary's investigative function in the matter did not of itself require
recusal. The reason for requiring the appearance of fairness in a hearing
is to maintain public confidence in the administrative agency and the
administrative system. 92 Does a sequence of events where one official
personally investigates the scene of a possible statutory violation, issues
a compliance order on the basis of what is found, and then is a decision
maker on those facts, have an appearance of fairness? Only to an
unrealistic observer could such a scenario appear just and equitable.
The nature of the administrative proceeding should also be considered
in deciding the validity of a combination of functions. Professor Asimow
advocates strict separation of functions characteristic of a criminal law
model in accusatory proceedings, such as those considering the imposition
of a penalty or the revocation of a license. 93 "In such cases, an agency
rightly tolerates substantial inefficiencies in the interest of fairness and
the appearance of fairness. ' 94 The hearing in Rollins was to be such
an accusatory proceeding.
Although the United States Supreme Court upheld a combination
of functions in Withrow v. Larkin, the Court did not intend that every
combination be allowed; 9 "[i]ndeed, the growth, variety, and complexity
of the administrative processes have made any one solution highly un-
90. 306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See also Marshall, 446 U.S. at 242, 100 S. Ct.
at 1613; Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 92 S. Ct. 2163 (1972); deKoevend, 688 P.2d at
228.
91. Rollins, 481 So. 2d at 119 (emphasis in original).
92. Marshall, 446 U.S. at 242, 100 S. Ct. at 1613; Harris v. Hornbaker, 98 Wash.2d
650, 658 P.2d 1219, 1222 (1983).
93. Asimow, supra note 66, at 791-92. Professor Asimow distinguishes between ac-
cusatory proceedings, rulemaking of general applicability, and nonaccusatory decision-
making.
94. Id. at 792.
95. Id. at 783.
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likely." ' 96 Realizing that some combinations of functions would reach
unconstitutional limits, the Supreme Court provided a test. A contention
that a certain combination of functions is unconstitutional must "over-
come a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as ad-
judicators." 97 One challenging a combination of functions must convince
a court that "under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and
human weakness, conferring investigative and adjudicative powers on
the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment
that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is
to be adequately implemented." 98 Furthermore, the Supreme Court pro-
vided that a court may determine "from the special facts and circum-
stances present in the case before it that the risk of unfairness is
intolerably high." 99 The determination of a trial court in this respect is
entitled to deference. 1'0
The particular combination of functions in the Secretary in the
Rollins case presents one of those situations to which the Court in
Withrow alluded, where there is posed "such a risk of actual bias or
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of
due process is to be adequately implemented." The combination in the
Secretary of investigative and adjudicative functions actually exercised
in this matter, along with her statutory powers and duties, should have
disqualified the Secretary as a decision maker even if she had made no
public statements.
The Louisiana Legislature has granted extensive powers and duties
to the Secretary of the Department of Environmental Quality.10' Among
other things, the Secretary has the power of rulemaking "for the pro-
tection of the environment,"'' 0 2 the power to grant or deny permits or
licenses, 103 the power to conduct meetings, hearings, inquiries, and in-
vestigations, 104 and the power to issue cease and desist orders. 05 More
96. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 51, 95 S. Ct. at 1466.
97. Id. at 47, 95 S. Ct. at 1464.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 58, 95 S. Ct. at 1470.
100. Id.
101. Most of the Secretary's statutorily provided powers and duties are found at La.
R.S. 30:1061(D) (Supp. 1987). Prior to 1983, these powers did not rest in the Secretary
as an individual, but rather were granted to "the office," the state environmental agency
as a whole. 1983 La. Acts No. 97, § 1, amended La. R.S. 30:1061 to effect this change.
The text of the statute, as it existed prior to amendment, is set forth under the current
version of the statute in the 1987 Supplement.
102. La. R.S. 30:1061(D)(1) (Supp. 1987).
103. La. R.S. 30:1061(D)(2) (Supp. 1987).
104. La. R.S. 30:1061(D)(5) (Supp. 1987). See also La. R.S. 30:1061(D)(3) (Supp.
1987).
105. La. R.S.-30:1061(D)(6) (Supp. 1987).
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broadly, the Secretary has the power to "issue such orders or deter-
minations as may be necessary to effectuate the purpose of this
Chapter,"' 6° and the authority to "exercise all incidental powers necessary
or proper to carry out the purposes of this Chapter."' 01 The "purposes
of the Chapter" are, in essence, the "maintenance of a healthful and
safe environment,"'' 08 to be accomplished by providing policies and
implementing programs designed to "preserve, protect, and enhance the
quality of the environment in Louisiana."' 9 In other words, the Secretary
has been granted the authority to exercise all necessary or proper in-
cidental powers in order to protect the Louisiana environment.
Furthermore, in 1986, the legislature created the additional duty that
"[t]he secretary shall act as the primary public trustee of the environ-
ment.""'0 Even before the 1986 act, the Louisiana Supreme Court ar-
ticulated the existence of a public trust of the environment vested in
the Environmental Control Commission (ECC), a forerunner of the
present Department of Environmental Quality,"' by virtue of the Lou-
isiana Constitution." 2 In Save Ourselves v. Louisiana Environmental
Control Commission," 3 Justice Dennis wrote:
Since the ECC, in effect, has been designated to act as the
primary public trustee of natural resources and the environment
in protecting them from hazardous waste pollution, it necessarily
follows that the agency must act with diligence, fairness and
faithfulness to protect this particular public interest in the re-
sources. 114
In making an observation of the duty imposed by the role of public
trustee, the court noted further that "the commission's role as the
representative of the public interest does not permit it to act as an
umpire passively calling balls and strikes for adversaries appearing before
it; the rights of the public must receive active and affirmative protection
at the hands of the commission.""' It has even been suggested that the
106. Id.
107. La. R.S. 30:1061(D)(14) (Supp. 1987).
108. La. R.S. 30:1053(A) (Supp. 1987).
109. Id.
110. 1986 La. Acts No. 905.
Ill. See La. R.S. 30:1062 (Supp. 1987).
112. La. Const. art. IX, § I provides:
The natural resources of the state, including air and water, and the healthful,
scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the environment shall be protected,
conserved, and replenished insofar as possible and consistent with the health,
safety, and welfare of the people. The legislature shall enact laws to implement
this policy.
113. 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984).




public trust doctrine "furnishes environmental litigants with a judicially
enforceable right" enabling citizens of Louisiana to sue the environmental
agency for the breach of its duty as public trustee." 6 Thus, the overall
message to the Secretary from the legislature and even the supreme
court is clear: "Your duty is to use your powers to protect the envi-
ronment."
These statutory and jurisprudential powers and duties of the Sec-
retary should not alone disqualify her from acting as a decision maker.
As noted earlier, administrators should be "biased" as to matters of
policy and law.' 1 7 In this case, that bias favors the protection of the
environment; in all cases, the Withrow presumption of "honesty and
integrity""'  of decision makers serves to protect such valid biases.
However, the extent of the Secretary's bias toward protection of the
environment is relevant to the disqualification issue. When one considers
the extent of such a bias in the case of the Secretary as mandated
statutorily and jurisprudentially, in conjunction with the extent and
personal nature of functions actually exercised by the Secretary in the
Rollins matter," 9 one must conclude that "under a realistic appraisal
of psychological tendencies and human weakness,' 120 there existed a very
substantial risk of actual bias or prejudgment.
Despite the troubling language of Rollins signalling acceptance of
the combination of functions in the Secretary, courts faced with a
combination of functions issue should recognize the continued vitality
of the notion of certain combinations as grounds for disqualification
of an administrative agency decision maker from an adjudication. The
general tendency of the United States Supreme Court toward tolerance
of combinations in cases such as Withrow does not preclude recusal on
such grounds, nor does it prevent a broader construction of the state
constitution to afford greater protection than the federal minimum stand-
ards of due process.' 2' The language by the court in Rollins on this
issue also might be limited as mere dictum, unnecessary to the holding
since disqualification was ordered on prejudgment grounds as a result
of the Secretary's statements.
116. Note, Constitutional Law and the Environment: Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana
Environmental Control Commission, 59 Tul. L. Rev. 1557, 1572 (1985). For further
commentary on the public trust doctrine in Louisiana, see Comment, The Public Trust
Doctrine as a Basis for Environmental Litigation in Louisiana, 27 Loy. L. Rev. 469
(1981).
117. See text accompanying supra notes 19-27.
118. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47, 95 S. Ct. at 1464.
119. See text accompanying supra notes 64-67.
120. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47, 95 S. Ct. at 1464.
121. State v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381, 1385 (La. 1982); Guidry v. Roberts, 335
So. 2d 438, 448 (La. 1976).
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Instead of piecemeal adjudication, legislation would offer a pref-
erable solution to the problem of combinations of functions. Although
the Louisiana Legislature has granted substantial powers to the Secretary,
it has also implicitly recognized the inherent dangers present when an
individual exercises a combination of functions. Louisiana Revised Stat-
utes 49:960(A) provides in essence that agency decision makers shall not
directly or indirectly communicate, in connection with any issue, with
any person engaged in the performance of investigative, prosecuting, or
advocating functions. 122 In this statute, the Legislature has prohibited
mere communication of a decision maker with one who has performed
another function; a fortiori, the performance of these functions by the
same individual should be prohibited. Furthermore, if one accepts the
premise that the Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act (of which
Revised Statute 49:960 is a part) should be viewed as a "legislative
determination of the contours of minimal procedural due process, '
then an extension of the above reasoning is that a combination of
adjudicative and other functions in an individual is violative of due
process.
The Louisiana Legislature should clarify its position by enacting a
provision prohibiting significant personal prior involvement of an ad-
versary nature in an accusatory proceeding by a decision maker. Such
a provision would be consistent with the common arrangement of ad-
ministrative agencies.124 Until legislative clarification is provided, courts
should restrict combinations of functions such as those found in Rollins
by disqualification of decision makers on due process grounds.
H. David Vaughan, II
122. Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:960(A) (Supp. 1987) provides:
Unless required for the disposition of ex parte matters authorized by law;
members or employees of an agency assigned to render a decision or to make
findings of fact and conclusions of law in case of adjudication noticed and
docketed for hearing shall not communicate, directly or indirectly, in connection
with any issue of fact or law, with any party or his representative, or with any
officer, employee, ,or agent engaged in the performance of investigative, pros-
ecuting, or advocating functions, except upon notice and opportunity for all
parties to participate.
123. Louisiana's "New" Administrative Procedure Act: Legislative Symposium, 35 La.
L. Rev. 629, 631 (1975).
124. Davis Text, supra note 17, at 258.
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